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Credit Due Judgments and Credit
Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit in
the Interstate Context
Lea Brilmayer*
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."' The statute
that Congress adopted to implement this provision requires that
[s]uch Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof,
so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Posses-
sions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 2
The parallel treatment of judgments and legislative acts is evident. Yet
virtually the entire effect of the clause and its implementing statute has
occurred in the context of interstate enforcement of judicial decisions. The
impact on the disregard of other states' laws has been minimal.
Interstate recognition of other states' rules of law has instead been
addressed under the rubric of due process. 3 The due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment provides that no state "shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ' 4 If one
reads these words literally, one may not recognize the relationship be-
tween due process and choice of law or assertions of long arm jurisdic-
tion, which is the other conflict of laws context in which due process has
been important. 5 And if one strays from the literal meaning, one may
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1. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). This version of the statute was not adopted until 1948;
earlier versions did not include the same reference to public "acts." R. LEFLAR, L.
McDOUGAL III& R. FELIX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 187
(1982). The failure to include public "acts" bears on some of the cases decided before
1948, but does not affect the thesis presented in this Article. Before the act was adopted,
the constitutional parallelism might have required greater deference to laws; after the statute
was amended in 1948 the deliberate inclusion of public "acts" should have signaled a
desire for parallel treatment. The primary thrust of this Article is the different impact
that the constitutional provisions themselves have had.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Id.
5. Due process undoubtedly implies a requirement of notice of pendingjudicial pro-
ceedings and an opportunity to defend. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
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not understand why due process has been restricted to those areas but
not extended to judgments.
The puzzle is further confounded by occasional counterexamples to
this general picture. One line of decisions applies the full faith and credit
clause to cases involving both adjudicative jurisdiction and choice of law. 6
These cases negate the possibility that full faith and credit applies only
to judgments. Case law also contradicts the ambitious thesis, put forth
by one author,7 that the difference between the two clauses is that due
process protects individual rights and full faith and credit protects sister
states' sovereignty. 8 Cases suggest, 9 and I agree, 10 that both goals play
important roles for both clauses.
The difference between the clauses lies elsewhere." Due process
prevents the states from overreaching by preventing them from applying
their adjudicative processes or rules of decision to the exclusion of the ad-
judicative processes or rules of decision of a sister state. The paradigm
due process violation involves the ouster of one state's authority by ap-
plication of the authority of another. Full faith and credit prevents a dif-
ferent evil: discrimination. The paradigm full faith and credit violation
involves a state's refusal to apply the local law of either state. Such a refusal
is discriminatory if the state refuses to extend benefits of forum law without
deferring to the laws of the other state. Due process sometimes forbids
the state to use its own decision processes, or to apply its own law. Full
faith and credit adds that foreign law, typically, is the only other choice.
That full faith and credit governs the recognition of judgments and
due process regulates adjudicative jurisdiction and choice of law is coin-
cidental in two respects. First, either of these vague phrases-"due" pro-
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). This requirement is not unique to the conflict of
laws context, however. For an analysis of the due process limits on state court jurisdic-
tion, see generally Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State CourtJurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 45-50.
7. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNqELL L. REV. 185, 192
(1976). But see Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 150 (1976) (response to Professor Martin). For further discus-
sion on this point, see Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151, 153-55
(1976).
8. See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 & n.10 (1981) (similar approach
taken under due process and full faith and credit on choice of law questions). But see id.
at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring) (due process protects individual's interest in fair adjudica-
tion; full faith and credit protects sovereignty of sister states).
9. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980)
(due process limits on personal jurisdiction implicate state sovereignty concerns).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 12-15, 80-84.
11. One minor distinction between the two clauses is that full faith and credit applies
only when the competing jurisdiction is another state, and not a foreign country. Home
Ins. Co. v, Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1930). This difference obviously has functional
repercussions. It cannot explain the whole range of cases arising within the United States,
some of which have been decided under full faith and credit, and some under due process.
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CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
cess, or "full" faith and credit-might have assumed either function. Keep
in mind that the Supreme Court became involved in policing state asser-
tions of long arm jurisdiction, citing full faith and credit, before the four-
teenth amendment was even adopted. 12 Courts could even more easily
have fit choice of law under the full faith and credit rubric; in fact, in
some early cases that seem to have been discredited,1 3 the Court did exactly
that. 14 And judgments could perhaps have been treated under due pro-
cess instead of full faith and credit. At one time the Supreme Court believed
that due process placed limits on choice of law because due process pro-
tected rights that had "vested" in another state. '5 This rationale is elastic
enough to accommodate interstate enforcement of judgments.
The second reason that our present pattern of results is coincidental
is that there is no logical reason either for discrimination issues to arise
in the judgments context, or for overreaching issues to arise in choice of
law or adjudicative jurisdiction contexts. Given the sorts of temptations
to which states fall prey, however, it is predictable as a practical matter
that discrimination would arise in one context and overreaching in another.
Hence, occasional examples exist in which full faith and credit limits ad-
judicative or legislative jurisdiction. These anomalies and their explana-
tions form the latter part of this analysis of full faith and credit in in-
terstate decisionmaking.16 The best place to start is the easiest example:
discrimination in the law of judgments.
I. CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS
The credit due judgments is, unmistakably, greater than the credit
due laws. For example, whether states have any constitutional obligations
whatsoever with regard to the tax and penal laws of their sister states is
unclear. Yet it is established that once such claims have been reduced
to judgments, they must be recognized elsewhere.' 7 At first the difference
12. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174-75 (1850). There the
forerunners of "due process" limits on state court jurisdiction were based on the full faith
and credit clause and implementing statute, and on what were termed "general prin-
ciples of comity and justice." Id. at 175. One aspect of personal jurisdiction to which
the full faith and credit clause arguably could not have been applied, however, might
be in-state enforcement of local judgments rendered without personal jurisdiction.
13. For a discussion of the argument that one such case, Bradford Elec. Light Co.
v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), has been discredited, see Currie, The Constitution
and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv.
9, 23-30 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188,
205-14 (1963). But see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979) (Clapper cited recently
by the Supreme Court).
14. E.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155-59 (1932).
15. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143,
150 (1934) (a state "may not, on grounds of policy, ignore a right which has lawfully
vested elsewhere"); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-74, 376-77 (1918).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 45-79.
17. See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (full
faith and credit for tax judgment).
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might seem attributable to different institutional sources: judgments are
judicial and laws are legislative. This explanation breaks down, however,
because common-law precedents are probably treated as laws and not as
judgments.' 8 The difference in treatment relates to adjudication versus
legislation, and not to judges versus legislatures. The usual explanation
falls into two parts: first, the constitutional policies underlying interstate
enforcement of judgments; and second, the reasons for not extending those
policies to legislation and precedent.
The constitutional policies underlying interstate enforcement of
judgments are the familiar justifications for the rule of res judicata: "[They]
are everywhere the same: to minimize the judicial energ
, devoted to in-
dividual cases, establish certainty and respect for court judgments, and
protect the party relying on the prior adjudication from vexatious
litigation."' 9 Or, stated more succinctly, one trial of an issue is enough.20
While there is no way to ascertain, without reopening the issue, that the
first court did not err, the reopening cannot settle the matter any more
decisively. Because there is no reason for assuming that a second decision
will be more authoritative than the first, why not leave well enough alone?
The losing party, after all, already had an opportunity to present his or
her case.
Legislation is different. The more tentative nature of legislative
judgments is due in part to the fact that legislatures themselves may change
their minds. In contrast to adjudicative findings of past fact, legislation
amounts to an act of will, a deliberate leap into the future. A legislative
change of heart is vacillation, not inconsistency. If legislative choices can
be made and remade at will, it is not clear why the), should bind other
coequal decisionmaking bodies, such as sister states, more than they bind
the legislature itself.
Legislative decisions are also less final because they are incomplete.
Before they have effect they must be instantiated through the processes
of fact-finding and norm interpretation. This process may involve either
the giving of content to ambiguous norms or the modification of apparently
clear norms to reflect new circumstances of application. The inability of
legislatures to anticipate such circumstances is one reason for the existence
of the institution of judicial review. 21 Litigation brings more than new
facts into the controversy; it brings into the controversy new parties that
may not have been adequately represented in the legislative process. 22
18. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 11-13 (1945), reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 229, 237-38
(M. Culp ed. 1956).
19. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 657 (3d ed. 1981).
20. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
21. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method,
57 B.U.L. REV. 807, 815-19 (1977).
22. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on -the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1979).
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CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
Unlike the losing party in litigation, the losing party in legislation may
not have had a "day in court."
Legislation is thus not final to the extent that it is subject, unavoidably,
to legislative revision or creative interpretation and application. Judicial
decisions are final, in contrast, because they are relatively complete. The
facts have been found, the norms have been interpreted. In addition, after
a dispute reaches court, opportunities exist to review the constitutionality
of the legal norms involved. This may be particularly important in the
interstate judgments context. Even if a legislative rule is clearly designed
to apply to some particular interstate dispute, other states should not be
required to accept that decision as final. The intended territorial applica-
tion may be unconstitutional. 23 When the application of forum law has
been reduced to judgment, however, the parties will have had an oppor-
tunity to dispute the constitutionality of the rule's application to those
facts, and to appeal that decision if necessary. The Supreme Court will
not pass on the validity of a state rule in the abstract, before a concrete
dispute arises. 24
The greater deference due judgments can be found in a surprising
variety of contexts. For instance, the Supreme Court has emphasized
recently that state court judgments cannot be disregarded on the theory
that state courts are inadequate tribunals for the enforcement of constitu-
tional rights.25 The Court has explained that state judges, like federal
judges, have sworn oaths to uphold the Constitution. This argument is
strikingly similar to the argument that Alexander Bickel made regarding
the institution of judicial review. Bickel claimed that legislators, both state
and federal, are sworn to respect the Constitution precisely as are federal
court judges. 26 Why has this argument been persuasive when adjudica-
tion but not legislation is involved? The finality policies of legislation and
judgments presented above form at least part of the answer.
While the respective finality accorded legislative and adjudicative deci-
sions is common to all states, this does not mean that all states accord
judgments the same degree of finality. There are some species of adjudica-
tions, such as child custody deteinminations, in which relitigation is more
readily available. 27 In these areas, in particular, states differ over what
constitutes an adequate basis for modification of a judgment. States also
differ over questions of who may be bound, and who can take advantage
23. Typically, when the Supreme Court has analyzed whether a state has an "in-
terest" in having its law applied, it has disregarded state choice of law provisions that
have been accorded no deference. See generally Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate
Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1315, 1326 (1981).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (case or controversy limitation).
25. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-05 (1980). Note that the rejected
approach is discriminatory in that it credits state courts less than it credits federal courts.
Id. at 98-101.
26. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 34-72 (1962).
27. See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 19, at 858-78.
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of a prior adjudication.2 8 It is sometimes said that the full faith and credit
clause places the Constitution behind the policies of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel.29 But this surely does not mean that states are obliged
to adhere to traditional res judicata rules without exception. Would it ever
be said that some minimum amount of deference to judicial decisions is
owing, as a matter of constitutional law? Are res judicata rules constitu-
tionally compelled?
I doubt it.30 Due precisely to the policies presented above, states have
not attempted to abolish the law of res judicata. Therefore, there are no
cases on this issue. Res judicata rules are simply too useful to abolish.
And therein lies the true explanation for the constitutional solicitude toward
judgments. As long as all states have finality rules that credit judicial deci-
sions, it seems impermissible for a state to refuse to enforce foreign
judgments. Because local judgments are enforceable, foreign judgments
also should be enforceable. In every state, judgments have been accorded
greater finality than laws; it is natural to expect this to be the case for
interstate situations as well.
What did the framers most clearly seek to prohibit with the full faith
and credit clause? The paradigm full faith and credit violation surely in-
volves a judgment which would be enforceable under the local laws of
both the rendering state and the enforcing state, but is refused enforce-
ment simply because it is foreign. No other refusal of recognition could
pose more of a threat to national unity. The fundamental problem that
interstate or international judgment recognition must address is
discrimination.
In the intrastate context, the meaning of discrimination is clear,
although its applications are controversial. Discrimination results when
cases that ought to be treated identically are treated differently. The problem
is to ascertain whether cases are sufficiently different to warrant different
treatment. There is an added twist in the interstate setting. On a super-
ficial level, discrimination apparently results when a case (or person, or
rule of law, or judgment) receives different treatment simply because it
is foreign. Foreignness, however, is not irrelevant. If a state tries to treat
all cases with foreign elements as though they are purely local, then it
would fail just as miserably to respect the sovereignty of other states.
28. For instance, some states require mutuality of estoppel and some do not. Compare
Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co., 444 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1971) (Seventh Circuit
requires mutuality) with Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 303, 340 (2d Cir. 1962) (neither
New York nor California requires mutuality).
29. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942). Others state more
accurately that the clause "puts national sanction behind state policies with respect to
the effect of a judgment." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 19, at 661.
30. The Court, however, does police res judicata rules to protect parties not represented
in the initial decision from being bound.
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CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
Applying the local law of a competing state is not considered
discriminatory because the foreign elements in the case warrant that kind
of deference to foreign states. The law of judgments reinforces this con-
clusion. If the enforcing state declines to apply its own res judicata rules,
applying the rules of the rendering state instead, one would not condemn
the enforcing state for discriminating against the foreign judgment. To
the contrary, by deferring, the state is acting precisely as the full faith
and credit statute requires.3 1 And even if there were no full faith and credit
statute, the result would be unobjectionable under the Constitution. Surely
the Constitution would not be offended when the rights that vested in
the original judgment are respected literally, according to the preclusion
policies of the rendering state.
A more interesting problem involves application of the enforcing state's
preclusion policies. At first this seems to be an obvious violation of the
language of the implementing statute, which requires that the same effect
be given to the judgment as it would have been given in the state in which
it was rendered. It is a testament to the strength of the nondiscrimination
principle as a full faith and credit norm that this literal approach to the
statute has not been adopted. Instead, the Supreme Court has been sur-
prisingly accommodating to application of forum res judicata rules, which
the Court has classified as "remedial" or "procedural" when explaining
its disregard of the explicit statutory language. 32
31. There is one situation in which a full faith and credit violation might occur even
if the state applies one of the two contending rules. That situation arises when the state
fails to consistently apply one rule or the other, choosing between them on a case by case
basis by some invidious criterion. Because deference to the needs of other states is the
basic principle, the forum may not use an invidious criterion inconsistent with the need
for deference. For instance, it might be invidious for a state simply to choose the law
that benefits the local resident more.
For the only article dealing with this double meaning of discrimination, see Ely, Choice
of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).
There Dean Ely recognizes that the garden variety interstate discrimination problem in-
volves applying a third standard to nonresidents: the local law of neither state. Id. at 184-86.
He then argues that Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975), may possibly in-
validate as discriminatory a forum state's efforts to treat nonresidents as their home states
would. This reading of Austin may be misguided. The "application" of home state law
merely consisted of a forum state's credit toward taxes due on income earned in that forum
that a nonresident paid to his home state. This is not equivalent to application of home
state law because if home state tax law deliberately exempted income earned in other
states, that exemption would be ignored. Second, even when home state law was applied,
the result was not deference to the home state because the forum used the home state
tax rate to augment its own revenue. Dean Ely is well aware of these facts, and in his
insightful discussion he declines to push Austin too far. See Ely, supra, at 187. The limited
relevance of Austin would be clearer had Dean Ely explicitly recognized the different
rationales for the "applications" of home state law. Usually the rationale is deference,
but as argued immediately above, invidious discrimination may underlie an apparently
deferential choice of the other state's law.
32. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 9-10, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS 229, 236 (M. Culp ed. 1956).
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It seems, then, that if the enforcing state applies the preclusion rules
of one of the involved states, it satisfies the constitutional mandate and
probably squares itself with the statutory standard as well. 33 The same
cannot be said if the enforcing state adopts neither course. Watkins v.
Conway34 tests this thesis. At first the result seems to contradict the
discrimination hypothesis, but the Watkins Court in fact adopts the thesis,
while perhaps mistakenly applying it. In Watkins, the enforcing state,
Georgia, applied a five-year statute of limitations to foreign judgments,
but a longer statute of limitations to local ones. 35 It was argued that this
violated both the full faith and credit and the equal protection clauses.
36
The Court agreed that if the rule were discriminatory, it -might be
unconstitutional. 37
The Court held, however, that there was no discrimination because
the plaintiff could return to the rendering state and revive the judgment
there. 38 At that point, the judgment would be enforceable in Georgia under
Georgia law:
[T]he Georgia statute has not discriminated against the judg-
ment from Florida. Instead, it has focused on the law of that
State. . . . Thus, full faith and credit is insured, rather than
denied, the law of the judgment State. Similarly, there is no denial
of equal protection in a scheme that relies upon the judgment
State's view of the validity of its own judgments. 39
The Court may have been incorrect in concluding that the requirement
of returning to the rendering state for revival was neither burdensome
nor discriminatory. In particular, if the judgment was still enforceable
in Florida, but Florida had no revival procedure, then the Georgia law
would deny enforcement in a discriminatory way. The Court explicitly
left open how it would rule in such a case. 40 According to the reasoning
in the case, however, discriminatory judgments rules are highly suspect.
While discrimination is ordinarily suspect, as with other areas of
discrimination law a difference in treatment may be justifiable. There are
rare situations in which the judgments law of neither state is applied, yet
the full faith and credit clause is not offended. Such situations may arise
under The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 41 That
33. It has been noted that credit to judgments may be analyzed as a choice of law
problem. Averill, Choice-of-Law Problems Raised by Sister-State Judgments and the Full-Faith-
and-Credit Mandate, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 686, 686 (1969); see also Brilmayer, State Forfeiture
Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 741, 744 (1982).
34. 385 U.S. 188 (1966) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 188-89.
36. Id. at 189.
37. Id. at 189-90.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 190-91.
40. Id. at 191 n.4.
41. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979). See generally
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislatite Remedy for Children
Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969).






onway3+ t i t
i ,
l , i ,
,
t 35





38 t l r





's i f t e ali it of its o n judg ents.39
~ t i t
ri g
i i atory. t
i l ri , t l i i l , t t i l
l f r ent i i ri i t ry . t li itl
l ft it l r l i . 40 r i t t r i
, , t r W
ti il




. It t t t r it t j ts l i
proble . erill, ice- j- roble s ise by Sister-State J e ts ~nd the ll- aith-
· redit te, . . . . , ( ); see ls ril a er, t te ifeiture
l s ll e eral i f t te ri illal i ti llS, . HI. . . , ( ).
. . . ( ) ( r ri ).
. ! . .
[ .
. I . t .
. .
. .
. ! . t . .
41. IF. IL C ST J IS I TI , 9 . . . III (1979). See generally
odenhei er, he nifor il ustody J risdiction ct: e isl tiu e edy j r ildren
au.ght ill the Ollflict f s, . . . ( ).
CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
Act has now been superceded by the federal Parental Kidnapping Act 42
but the historical and conceptual point remains the same. The UCCJA,
like its federal successor, was designed to remove the incentive to forum
shop for modifications of a custody order through the expedient of snatching
the child in question and absconding to another jurisdiction. Because child
custody orders are typically modifiable in the rendering state, the other
jurisdiction appealed to could revise the decree without violating the let-
ter of full faith and credit. The spirit of full faith and credit was hardly
appeased, since although the rendering state might have had power to
modify the decree, the chances that it would exercise that power were
substantially lower than the chances of modification in some other state
that disagreed with the original order on the merits. That, of course, was
the purpose of absconding.
The solution adopted by the UCCJA was to severely restrict the power
of any court other than that of the rendering state to entertain modifica-
tion proceedings. 43 Although the issue apparently was never raised or
litigated, a full faith and credit question might have been posed. When
a state adopts a rule that deprives its courts of jurisdiction to entertain
proceedings on other states' judgments, and the only basis for different
treatment is that the judgment was not rendered locally, the state seems
to lay an uneven hand on local and foreign causes of action. The response
must be that while there is indeed a difference in treatment, the difference
is not discriminatory because its rationale is preservation of the power
of the rendering state. In fact, the intended effect is to direct the litigants
back to the rendering state to raise their grievances there.
Absent such a deferential rationale, failure to accord a judgment the
status it would have had under both states' local laws is a violation of
full faith and credit. If the states have a common policy of finality, then
denying that common policy of preclusive effect simply because enforce-
ment is sought interstate is invidious discrimination. Such a denial is not
per se invalid, but it must be explained in terms of policies consistent
with the full faith and credit clause. The full faith and credit clause does
not speak to the choice of law issue44 of which forum's res judicata rule
applies; it does, however, say that, absent good justification, the choice
is limited to the local laws of the involved states.
II. CREDIT TO LAWS
A series of cases that apply full faith and credit to choice of law
issues suggests that discrimination is the relevant mode of analysis for full
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
43. Technically speaking, it is the child's "home state" that has the power to modify,
but in most instances this will be the rendering state and the rationale of deference re-
mains the same. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODYJURISDICTION ACT §§ 2(5), 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 119,
122 (1979). The concept of "home state" has been adopted by the Federal Parental Kid-
napping Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)(4), (c)(2) (1982), along with its attendant difficulties.
44. For articles discussing this as a choice of law problem, see supra note 33.
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faith and credit issues. In Hughes v. Fetter"4 the Court invalidated a state
rule that deprived local courts of adjudicative jurisdiction over wrongful
death actions that arose in other states. The Court explicitly based its in-
validation on the discriminatory nature of the jurisdictional rule. Because
local wrongful death actions were adjudicated with ease, there was no in-
herent hostility toward them. The Court distinguished situations in which
the state merely had applied its own local law, sfiggesting that these situa-
tions were not violations of full faith and credit. 46 Other cases reinforce
Hughes' holding and reasoning. 47
The discrimination prohibited by the full faith and credit clause in
the context of credit to laws is analogous to the discrimination prohibited
in the context of credit to judgments. In Hughes the state applied neither
its own local law regarding wrongful death actions nor the wrongful death
act of the state where the cause of action arose. As with credit to judgments,
the obligation of credit to laws does not determine the choice between
contending domestic rules. It simply requires that, absent adequate justifica-
tion for the difference in treatment, one of the two domestic rules must
be chosen.
First, full faith and credit is not offended when the domestic rule of
the other state is chosen. This is true even though a case is treated dif-
ferently because of its foreign elements. The different treatment is not
invidious because it is justified by a real difference in the case, namely
the factors connecting it to some other state, which make application of
some other state's authority appropriate. For example, state borrowing
statutes that apply the statute of limitations of the state that created the
cause of action justifiably defer to the other state's interests, thereby pre-
venting forum shopping. 48
In addition to borrowing statutes, certain other refusals to entertain
an action because of its foreign elements similarly are justifiable in terms
of deference. Read literally, Hughes would seem to invalidate long arm
statutes that differentiate between causes of action that arose inside the
state and those that arose outside. It would also cast doubt on forum non
conveniens dismissals that are motivated in part by the out-of-state locus
of the operative facts of the dispute.49 Of course, these dismissals are per-
missible because, unlike the dismissal in Hughes, the, are motivated by
deference to other states. A relevant analogy may be found in the law
of federal jurisdiction. While states may not "discriminate" against federal
causes of action by refusing to adjudicate them, refusal to entertain claims
45. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
46. Id. at 612 n.10.
47. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1935); Kenney v. Supreme
Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 415 (1920).
48. See, e.g., Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 25-2 U.S. 553, 559, 561 (1920).
49. The forum non conveniens doctrine was recently reaffirmed in Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Rcyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-52, 256-57 (1981).
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CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
over which federal courts statutorily are given exclusive jurisdiction is not
only permissible, it is required.5 0 The rationale is deference.
In this regard, full faith and credit is no different from prohibitions
on discrimination against persons in the interstate setting. Privileges and
immunities5' and equal protection5 2 restrict differential treatment of
nonresidents, while the right to travel5 3 restricts differential treatment of
new residents. All of these constitutional prohibitions operate most forcefully
when the state imposes neither its own domestic law nor the law of the
complainant's domicile (or, in the case of the right to travel, the old
domicile).5 4 The typical discrimination complaint involves a state rule that
gives the benefits of neither home state nor local law. Discrimination claims
have generally been unsuccessful when the rationale for differential treat-
ment is deference to another state.55
Application of the foreign law thus has never been characterized as
a violation of full faith and credit; and discrimination against foreign causes
of action that is grounded adequately in deference to other states also is
unobjectionable. For instance, despite Hughes' language, dismissals of other
states' divorce claims have not been considered violations of full faith and
credit.5 6 But this is too obvious. The more striking fact is that, except
for certain older cases that now seem to be discredited, 7 application of
local policy is an equally effective defense to alleged full faith and credit
violations. That full faith and credit is not offended when a state applies
50. Brilmayer & Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional
Claims: DiscriminatoryJurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REv. 819, 838-40
(1983).
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 5 2.
52. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
54. The typical discrimination challenge under any of these provisions involves a state
law which provides different benefits for residents and nonresidents. Nonresidents are
not accorded treatment as they would be by their home state. See Ely, supra note 31, at
186. This is not to say that there can never be a privileges and immunities challenge where
the law of one of the contending states is applied; the method of choosing between the
two laws may itself be invidious. See supra note 31; Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth
of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392, 408-17 (1980) (interest analysis tends to simply
analyze choice of law on the basis of which law helps the local resident). When the choice
between competing local laws is based on a consistent and noninvidious principle, privileges
and immunities, equal protection, and right to travel clauses have not required invalida-
tion. See, e.g., Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1978) (per curiam) (state may apply
its local welfare laws even though detrimental to right to travel).
55. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-09 (1975). The author expresses gratitude
to Lee Ryan, J.D. 1984, Yale Law School, for a very helpful development of this point
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
56. Brilmayer & Underhill, supra note 50, at 836-37. Federal courts also decline on
grounds of deference to entertain state domestic relations claims even when diversity jurisdic-
tion would otherwise exist. Id.
57. See Currie, supra note 13, at 26-27, reprinted in B. CURRIE; SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 209 (1963) (discussing one such case, Bradford Elec. Light
Co. v. Clapper).
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its local law is demonstrated by a host of cases in which full faith and
credit challenges have failed.
In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,58 two
worker's compensation statutes were vying for application. Each statute
contained a choice of law provision that seemed to make it applicable to
the instant case.5 9 The Court held that the state in which the employment
relationship was entered into was not required to give way to the state
in which the injury occurred. 60 Justice Stone wrote:
Primafacie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its
own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right,
because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state
by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of show-
ing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests
involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the
forum. 61
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co. 62 also supports this thesis. There the plain-
tiff argued that the forum should apply the statute of limitations of the
state that had created the cause of action, instead of applying its own statute
of limitations.6 3 The local statute of limitations barred the action prema-
turely, and the plaintiff suggested that full faith and credit compelled the
state to provide a forum. 64 The Court rejected this argument, however,
and distinguished Hughes v. Fetter on the ground that here the state was
merely applying its domestic rule evenhandedly. 65
A final case illustrates the failure of full faith and credit to police choice
of law problems, and its limitation to ensuring that the local law of one
or the other state will be applied. Nevada v. Hall 6 involved an automobile
accident in California between a California resident and an employee of
the University of Nevada, which is an instrumentality of the state. The
California trial court did not recognize Nevada's waiver of sovereign im-
munity to liability in tort actions. 67 The court reasoned that when Nevada
engaged in a course of conduct in California, it was simply not sovereign. 68
The California decision was challenged as a denial of full faith and
credit to the Nevada sovereign immunity law. 69 The Supreme Court upheld
58. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
59. Id. at 544-46.
60. Id. at 550.
61. Id. at 547-48.
62. 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id. at 516-17.
65. Id. at 518-19.
66. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
67. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 526 & n.10 (1972), 503 P.2d 1363,
105 Cal. Rptr. 355, 358 (1972).
68. Id. at 524, 503 P.2d at 1364, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
Rptr. 355, 356 (1972).
69. 440 U.S. at 414.
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CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
the California decision, but reasoned differently. 7 Specifically, the Court
noted that holding Nevada amenable to suit was consistent with Califor-
nia domestic law. 71 First, California had a policy of full compensation
that was manifested by both its substantive law and its procedural law
that provided for long arm jurisdiction over nonresident motorists. 72
Second,
[i]n further implementation of that policy, California has un-
equivocally waived its own immunity from liability for the torts
committed by its own agents and authorized full recovery even
against the sovereign. As the California courts have found, to
require California either to surrender jurisdiction or to limit
respondents' recovery to the $25,000 maximum of the Nevada
statute would be obnoxious to its statutorily based policies of
jurisdiction over nonresident motorists and full recovery. 73
The full faith and credit clause, the Court concluded, did not require this
result. 74
As framed by the state court below, the issue was unmistakably one
of full faith and credit. The state court had held that Nevada simply was
not entitled to sovereign immunity because it acted outside of its sovereign
boundaries. This rationale would have allowed full recovery even if Califor-
nia had retained its own sovereign immunity for its own purposes. The
full faith and credit issue stems from California's unwillingness to apply
the sovereign immunity law of either state, on the ground that while in
California, Nevada was not sovereign.
The Supreme Court obviated the full faith and credit objection by
noting that application of California's domestic law of sovereign immunity
would result in the same outcome. "[T]his Court's decision in Pacific In-
surance Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm 'n clearly establishes that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law
in violation of its own legitimate public policy." 75 The Court's resolution
of the full faith and credit issue merely served to raise another issue. Surely
the Court did not mean to state that local policy might always be applied
70. Id. at 414-27.
71. Id. at 421-24.
72. Id. at 424.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Court cited Justice Stone's interpretation of Bradford Elec. Light Co.
v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), which appeared in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939), for the analysis that Clapper merely
held that foreign law must be applied if there is no contrary local policy. Justice Stone
had concurred in Clapper on the ground that New Hampshire ought to have an oppor-
tunity to interpret local policy and refuse to apply Vermont law; full faith and credit,
he argued, did not prevent this result. Id. at 423 n.23; see Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at
548-49. By citing, in Nevada, Justice Stone's Clapper interpretation which appeared in the
1930's cases, Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, the Supreme Court seems to be resurrec-
ting Clapper with a new gloss. Full faith and credit is satisfied whenever the refusal to
apply foreign law is accompanied by the application of local public policy.
75. 440 U.S. at 421-22.
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to the exclusion of other states' rules. To the contrary, the policy interest
that the Court cited was compensation for persons injured on California
highways.7 6 Although chastised by the dissent for not making this point
more explicit, 77 the Court did not hold that California was free from all
constitutional impediments when applying its sovereign immunity law to
tort suits. 78 Rather, it only held that full faith and credit was not offended
when a bona fide local policy was applied; due process issues were not
discussed.
It was unnecessary to discuss other impediments to the application
of California law because, on the facts of Nevada v. Hall, the relevance
of California policy seemed clear: the injury took place in California and
the injured party resided there. One might have expected California law
to have been held applicable as a choice of law matter. Nevada v. Hall
thus stands for the proposition that if there are sufficient contacts to justify
application of local law under the due process clause, then application
of local law also satisfies full faith and credit. Other cases also suggest
that full faith and credit poses no choice of law requirements beyond the
requirements of due process. 79 If, however, forum contacts are more at-
tenuated, due process problems may arise. Full faith and credit merely
limits the choice, in most cases, to two alternatives: local and foreign law.
Due process sometimes requires a state to select foreign law.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The due process clause, which dominates choice of law theory, governs
those circumstances in which a state ousts the local law of another state
by the application of its own law. This is the usual choice of law problem;
in fact, to characterize an issue as "choice of law" is to say that the choice
is between two states' laws and thus that the evil to be avoided is the un-
fair ouster of the law of one state by another. The other conflicts context
in which due process has been prominent involves limits on state court
adjudicative jurisdiction, also an ouster problem. The problem in state
court adjudicative jurisdiction is that by adjudicating the case the state
ousts other states' adjudicative authority, thereby forcing other states not
only to give up the right to litigate but also to enforce the resulting
judgment.8 0  6
Due process issues are intrinsically more difficult than full faith and
credit issues. It is clear that a state has the right to apply its local rule
or use its local decision processes in purely local situations, and in cases
76. Id. at 421-24.
77. Id. at 428-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 424 n.24 (suggesting result was limited to accidents outside the state).
79. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308, 322 n.6 (1981).
80. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980) (states
have sovereignty rights and interests in trying cases in their own courts).
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that are purely local, no other state has a right to intervene. But there
is no bright line separating cases in which it is permissible to apply local
law from cases in which it is not. Any litigation has many relevant variables
and this allows for a large number of permutations depending on whether
these variables point toward one state or another. "Foreignness" is a matter
of degree, depending on how many of the relevant variables point toward
other states. Cases fall on a spectrum, or perhaps we should say a scatter
diagram, from purely local to purely foreign situations, so that any line
proves arbitrary. Due process is difficult to apply because of this line draw-
ing problem. Full faith and credit is easier to apply because it permits
relatively bright line distinctions: Absent adequate justification, the state
must use either its own rule or the rule of the competing state.
The roles of due process and full faith and credit have not been clearly
delineated because due process, as applied to conflict of law problems,
contains an element of "credit" in the ordinary meaning of the word.
Every time a state applies its own laws to the exclusion of the laws or
decision processes of another state, it is simultaneously extending the reach
of its own laws and refusing to extend the reach of another state's laws.
Full faith and credit language has been used when a state commits the
latter of these sins without committing the former. What distinguishes
due process from full faith and credit is that due process is invoked in
cases of overreaching. This overreaching aspect is the distinctive attribute
of due process. Refusal to apply the other state's law is not distinctive;
it is an issue common to both full faith and credit and due process. Because
of this element, which it shares with full faith and credit, due process has
been said to require states to respect the sovereignty of other states. 81
There is a paradox here. What seems to be violative of one clause
amounts to satisfaction of the other. By applying its own law, a state can
avoid full faith and credit objections, but that application triggers due pro-
cess scrutiny. This paradox led Brainerd Currie to reject the reasoning
in Hughes v. Fetter altogether, although he reached the same result by other
(and more dubious) means. 8 2 What is troublesome is that one clause en-
courages the very evil that the other is designed to prevent.
The tension in the themes is not a defect in theory; it is a conse-
quence of tension in the Constitution itself. The Constitution is a com-
bination of centrifugal and centripetal forces. All federal systems have such
problems. On the one hand, each state must recognize that other states
are separate sovereignties. Cases with foreign elements may not
be treated automatically as though they arose at home. On the other hand,
each state must recognize that it is not wholly independent. There will
81. See id. at 291-92.
82. See Gurrie, The Constitution and the "Transit" Cause of Action (pts. 1 & 2), 73 HARV.
L. REV. 36, 44-66, 286 (1959), reprinted in B. CURRIE SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 290-311 (1963) (arguing that the constitutional difficulty with the statute was
that it differentiated, for choice of law purposes, between in-state and out-of-state accidents).
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be cases in which a state must lend its aid to foreign suits. Refusing to
become involved is not the proper response to the presence of foreign
elements in the case. Foreign elements may require that a case not be
treated as purely local; but the proper alternative is enforcement of the
policies of the competing state. If deference to the other state is the reason
for not applying forum law, then consistency compels that the rationale
of deference be carried to its logical conclusion: application of the foreign
law.
Due process has come to represent the centrifugal force. The states
must recognize each other's independent sovereignty. "Does the island
of Tobago rule the world?" asked the British lord. 3 The question answers
itself; each state must act with the awareness that its own powers are limited.
On matters of state law, decentralized decisionmaking is protected, and
no state has the right to bring all legal issues under its law or bring all
legal disputes before its courts.
Full faith and credit represents the centripetal force that binds the
states together. The states may not be identical, but neither are they wholly
different. The full faith and credit clause differentiates the attitudes that
states must have toward one another from the attitudes they must have
towards foreign countries.84 Both due process and full faith and credit in-
volve deference to other states, but the former protects the right to affir-
mative assistance, while the latter protects the right to be left alone. There
are two ways that a state might avoid implementing the policies of other
states: shutting them off and squeezing them out. That protection is needed
on both scores is a function of the different ways that states seek to max-
imize their own power, and of the differences between judgments and laws.
IV. JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
Credit due judgments differs from credit due laws because the two
contexts lead to different strategies for the maximization of state power.
Power is a compound notion; one needs to know not only who seeks to
exercise power, but also over whom it will be exercised. This is particularly
true in the interstate context in which a state may expand its powers either
at the expense of the individual litigants or at the expense of other states-or
both. When a state makes a conflict of laws decision concerning either
adjudicative jurisdiction, choice of law, or judgments, one of the adver-
saries in the proceeding undoubtedly will be dissatisfied. Thus every deci-
83. See Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (K.B. 1808). A picture of the
courthouse on the island of Tobago can be found on the frontispiece of W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (7th ed. 1978).
84. See generally Brilmayer, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REV. 892 (1984) (reviewing
R. CASAD, CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE-STATE
ASSOCIATIONS: CENTRAL AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1981)).
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CREDIT DUE JUDGMENTS AND LAWS
sion includes a component of fairness to individuals. But whether it exer-
cises or refuses to exercise power vis-a-vis the individuals, the forum also
might disregard the sovereign interests of other states.
How can a failure to exercise power be as objectionable as the exer-
cise of power? That it unavoidably offends one of the adversaries is ob-
vious. But it also may offend the other state. Power is more than the simple
force necessary to effectuate a decision; it also includes will-the ability
to make a decision that calls for enforcement. Force is merely the
mechanical implementation of a decision, and thus necessarily entails max-
imizing power only at the expense of the individual. What increases power
at the expense of other states is the second element, will. In applying force
to effectuate someone else's decision, the decisionmaker gains at the ex-
pense of the individual but loses with regard to the entity that made the
decision. The strategically preferable posture is to make the decision that
will be enforced, for then the decisionmaker gains at the expense of both
the individual and the competing states.
We should therefore expect states to attempt to exert power over in-
dividuals, but only to the extent that states maintain some control over
the content of the decision being enforced. If a state does not maintain
control over that content, it finds itself either enforcing decisions it finds
repugnant (at worst) or wasting time (at best). Mechanical implementa-
tion of another state's rules or judgments does not further a forum's own
objectives, and possibly may even frustrate them. Sometimes, however,
the Constitution requires states to do exactly that.
At the outset of litigation, typically, very few decisions have been
made. Once judgment is entered, however, most of the decisionmaking
power is foreclosed by local preclusion policies. Thus, a state may seek to
assert jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation, but lack motivation to
assert jurisdiction once the case has been reduced to judgment in another
state.85 The exceptions would occur when many issues remained to be
resolved even after a final order has been entered8 6 and when the major
issues in the cases had been prejudged at the outset of the suit.8 7
Limitations on overreaching are therefore most necessary at the outset
of litigation, when the assertion of jurisdiction is most likely to constitute
an abuse of power. Limitations on the failure to assert jurisdiction are
necessary at the judgments phase, when most of the decisionmaking power
has already been exercised, for at that point failure to assert jurisdiction
increases forum power at the expense of the state in which the judgment
85. When judges enforce judgments from their own states, or adhere to precedent,
there is present an element of subservience to the rendered court's decision process.
However, the court is simultaneously affirming its own authority. If it departs from either
res judicata or stare decisis it would authorize future courts to disobey its own mandate.
86. See, e.g., R. GRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 19, at 858-78.
87. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 610 (1951) (choice of law issue already
clearly settled in favor of the other state's laws).
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was rendered. But since both states would enforce even arguably erroneous
prior decisions, the sheer disinclination to enforce judgments at the behest
of sister states is an inadequate reason and unavailing. It is precisely to
control such unilateral expansion of strategic positions that there are con-
stitutional limitations in the conflict of laws.
V. CONCLUSION
The two problems of deference to other states' interests-ouster and
discrimination-cut across a variety of conflicts issues. Ouster, which may
be classified as a problem of due process, dominates adjudicative jurisdic-
tion and choice of law, when the states themselves typically agree that
much decision power remains to be exercised. At later stages, when states
agree as a matter of local law that most issues have been resolved, an
additional tool becomes available with which to restrain the disregard of
other states. Since the state would violate its own foreclosure rules to reach
questions that were already decided, the issue can be easily treated by
prohibition against discrimination. At that point, it is not just a question
of whether the state would have had a right, ab initio, to impose its view
of the proper outcome; it is also a question of whether the state is disregard-
ing shared standards of foreclosure, and imposing that view in violation
of both domestic and foreign standards.
Full faith and credit got the easy job, and due process got the hard
one. The due process inquiry of whether a case is local enough to be treated
as local, or foreign enough that it must be treated as foreign, is surely
difficult. The full faith and credit determination that special norms may
not be employed to treat cases as neither foreign nor domestic is relatively
easy, for then the court need only check that one domestic standard or
the other was applied.
Perhaps it is coincidence that these two roles were assigned to these
two constitutional provisions. It is no coincidence, however, that the Con-
stitution limits state power in both of these ways. Our federal system strikes
a middle ground between uniformity and independence. State boundaries
are neither irrelevancies nor licenses to disengage.
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